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HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF HABEAS CORPUS
T HB history of mankind is a series of conflicts, sometimes
sanguinary, sometimes bloodless, between ruling forces
and the ruled. Over many centuries, the people have wrested,
one by one, rights and privileges denied to them by sovereigns
and retained control of them so that their liberty and well-
being might be augmented.
One of the most precious and most fought over princi-
ples of justice centers around what is called the writ of
habeas corpus, the bulwark of personal liberty. It is the
great heritage of Anglo-Saxons everywhere and through
many vicissitudes and setbacks it has survived as a shield
for the oppressed and a barrier to the exercise of tyrannical
power.
Many writers, in searching for the origin of this famous
writ, have declared it to be lost in antiquity. That the writ,
or some process similar to it, is of vast age is acknowledged.
But, our real and direct knowledge of it comes to us first
from Magna Carta, where the writ is indicated clearly.
Evidence is not lacking, however, to indicate that the
writ is neither of native British origin nor of Teutonic origin,
but that it came from that fountain-head of modern juris-
prudence, the Roman law. It would seem probable that
Rome gave us this process, as it has given us so many other
tenets of law. Roman legions and Roman law conquered
most of the then known world. The legions withdrew when
the Barbarians invaded the Empire, but the law remained,
then, as today, the source of rights and duties of the common
people.
In the early days of Rome, the Tribunes, magistrates
appointed to protect the plebeians against the oppressions,
and injustices of the ruling patrician class, had great power
given to them. This was vitally necessary, for the patricians,
through their control of office, by virtue of wealth and birth,
and through their interpretation of the laws, controlled not
alone the affairs of the city but the lives and destinies of its
people. The Tribunes were sole arbiters of the defendant's
fate. They had complete power over the people. They could
summon any citizen before them for trial, or could discharge
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the debtor from arrest. Here, perhaps, because of the ex-
igencies of the situation in which Rome found itself, lies the
germ of that idea that justice shall not be delayed.
In the condensation and codification of Roman court
decisions known as the Pandects or the Digest which was
compiled by order of Justinian, we find a writ so similar to
habeas corpus that there can be no doubt that in Rome lies
the true origin. A learned writer I on the subject says "The
writ (of habeas corpus) is somewhat similar to the Prae-
torian Interdict of the Roman Civil Law "de honine libero
exhibendo," in which the praetor ordered, when it was made
to appear to him that a freeman was restrained of his lib-
erty contrary to good faith, that he be liberated. Church I
also conservatively states that in the Roman interdict or
writ "de libero homine exhibendo" we may discern the origin
of our writ of habeas corpus.
The Pandects or Digest represents the sum total of
Roman Legal achievement. It contains that which is known
as the "Perpetual Edict" from the fact that these laws or
policies of the current consul, contrary to the established
custom, became a permanent part of Roman law.
In the first line of the "Perpetual Edict" we have the
praetor summoning before him the freeman who has been
unlawfully detained, by means of the writ called "de homine
libero exhibendo" (produce the person). The writ was de-
vised so that every freeman unlawfully detained might be
instantly produced before the praetor to inquire into his
detention.
The writ must have been used in England during the
four centuries of Roman occupancy. After the Romans
withdrew a period of confusion and chaos followed but the
writ was revived and became an integral part of English
law when order was once more established.
Slavery, of course, prevailed in Rome as it did else-
where. A Roman citizen or freeman alone could avail him-
self of the writ and the emphasis, therefore, was upon the
status of the petitioner and nothing else. In the course of
centuries and when class distinctions had been softened, if
I MYERs, TREATiSE ON HABEAS CORPUS 11.
2 CHURCH, HABEAS CORPUS 2.
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not entirely abolished by Christianity, more and more of the
common people could invoke the protection of the writ.
Six centuries elapsed between the coming of Augustine
to Kent in 596 A. D. and the signing of Magna Carta in
1215. During those years the words "habeas corpus" were
making their way into various writs, but it was not until
many years later that they became a customary means of
investigating imprisonment.
A common writ of the Middle Ages was the capias or
warrant of arrest. Capias was a process on an indictment
when the person was in custody and in cases not otherwise
provided for by statute. There were several forms of this
writ, entitled according to the purpose for which they were
intended. Capias ad respondendum was a judicial writ by
which actions at law were frequently commenced and which
commanded the sheriff to take the defendant and keep him
safely so that he might have his body before the court on
a certain day to answer the plaintiff. Capias utlagatum
lay against a person who had been outlawed in an action,
by which the sheriff was commanded to take him and keep
him in custody until the day of the return and then present
him to the court to be dealt with for his contempt. By
virtue of the capias ad satisfaciendum the sheriff could bring
the prisoner to court to satisfy a judgment against him.
Blackstone mentions four writs, which at the beginning
of the 13th century could be used to prevent unlawful im-
prisonment. They were writs of mainprize, de odio et atia,
de homine replegiando and habeas corpus. The first writ men-
tioned early fell into disuse because of inherent defects.
The writ "de odio et atia:" was invented by Henry II to rem-
edy abuses caused by the prevailing custom of trial by com-
bat. A newer method was that of indictment brought by
the king upon presentment of a jury. The former method
was notorious for the injustice it caused, since many charges
were prompted by hatred and malice. By the writ "'de odio
et atia"  trial by combat could be avoided if the justice found
that ill-will or hatred alone was the basis for charges. This
writ is indicated in article 39 of Magna Carta as not to be
denied but it was later abolished by a statute which was in
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turn repealed so that, although Sir Edward Coke maintained
it was still in force it also fell into disuse.
Another usual writ of the time was "de homine reple-
giando." This cast the responsibility for liberating his
prisoner upon the sheriff or constable. Upon the giving of
security for his appearance in court, the prisoner might,
at the discretion of the sheriff, be released but the sheriff
suffered the consequence if the prisoner did not appear at
the time of trial. The sheriff had to keep in custody, how-
ever, one who was imprisoned by the King's especial com-
mand or if he had murdered or had violated some forest
law or was in prison for an offense declared by law to be
unbailable. But, as Blackstone says "the writ de homine
replegiacndo was guarded with so many exceptions that it
was not an effectual remedy in many instances" and this
writ also fell into disuse.
The writ corpus cum causa. was used extensively by the
people as between themselves and the statute of 48 Edw.
III, 22 refers to it. It was issued in the name of the King,
and during the reign of Henry VI it was understood thor-
oughly by the judges as a writ to investigate the cause of
imprisonment. It does not appear, however, to have been
very effective in liberating a prisoner from custody who had
been placed there by the King's especial command. The
royal prerogative was still unchallenged.
Magna Carta marks a milestone in English legal his-
tory, not because of any great administrative or judicial
reforms but because it gave in detail the duties and powers
of those living under the Feudal Law.
It did not inaugurate any revolutionary policy nor
promulgate any new theory of the rights of man but merely
emphasized and reaffirmed certain cardinal principles upon
which the feudal system has rested.
The Magna Carta, the Great Charter of English lib-
erties, was the result of an effort on the part of the barons
and nobles of the kingdom to ease some of the burdens im-
posed on them by King John. During King Richard's long
absence in foreign lands, justice was a farce, the might of
the strong triumphed and no man was safe from violence nor
his possessions secure. The law was administered through
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graft, corruption and violence by persons whose sole aim
was their own aggrandizement.
When John came to the throne, conditions became even
worse, because one more class had been added to the list of
oppressed. This class, the barons, suffered greatly under
John's reign. Many of their ancient rights and privileges
were arbitrarily abolished and new duties imposed. The
King increased and multiplied his rights under the feudal
system; he violated terms of charters granted by his pre-
decessors; he confiscated lands and property. Arbitrary im-
prisonment and increased charges such as scutage and castle
guard, due to the King from the noble under the feudal
system, were added to the list of grievances. To this gen-
eral resentment of the curtailing of their ancient rights
(which was merely a phase of the conflict between royal
power and the nobility in the early age of most European
countries) many of the nobles, for personal reasons, were
desirous of limiting his prerogatives.
Some of the nobles looked downward to the commons
and perceived the plight that the collapse of the judicial
administration had cast them into and, hence, while the
Charter was primarily intended for the benefit of the nobles,
certain reforms were made which tended to better the lot
of the commons.
The Charter embodied clauses which, it was hoped,
would purge England of the hideous maladministration
which covered it like a black cloud and give to individuals
certain rights which not even the King could deny.
The document was signed by John at Runnymede, near
Windsor, June 15, 1215.. In 1299, by Statute 28 Edw. I,
Magna Carta was declared to be observed as the Common
Law of the Realm.3 In spite of this, John and his successors
constantly violated the terms of the Charter, particularly
the one dealing with imprisonment (Ch. 39). But in the
years that followed, the Charter was a standard to which
flocked all lovers of liberty. "In Magna Carta we get the
first attempt to the expression in exact legal terms of some
of the leading ideas of constitutional government. It was
11 BL Comm. 128.
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the first of many like services which the new common law
was to perform. There was no attempt to destroy the foun-
dations of law and orderly government which the crown had
laid. The period in which the law developed by the crown
alone was over; the period which will share in the estab-
lishment of a body which will limit the powers of the crown
and share in the making of laws had begun. Meantime the
common law was safe. The King himself was restrained but
the law remained. With the perfecting of the restraints
upon the royal power, it remained supreme." 4
Certain clauses written down for the first time in Magna
Carta, have survived in some form or another, in almost
every modern constitution and in some cases the exact word-
ing has been used.
"No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or outlawed
or exiled * * * except by legal judgment of his peers."
"Justice shall not be sold, denied or delayed."
"Fines shall be imposed in accordance with the gravity
of the offense but in no case shall they be so heavy as to
deprive any man of his livelihood."
"Nothing shall henceforth be given for a writ of inquiry
touching life or limb but it shall be granted freely and not
denied."
In spite of writs and Charter, almost every sovereign
of England attempted to assert the royal power as not being
confined by the law. John, though compelled to sign the
Charter, ignored it completely and Henry III confirmed the
Charter in 1225, only because of a threat by Parliament to
withhold subsidies. None succeeded in defying the King's
arbitrary command of imprisonment until the case of Hubert
De Brugh. This lord had been outlawed illegally by the
King but in 1234, after strenuous efforts, he was successful
in having the Royal Court (King's Bench) declare the com-
mand null and void as in violation of Magna Carta. It was
the first breach in the sovereign power.
Originally there were seven different writs of habeas
corpus. The one that has survived to this day is the writ
of habeas corpus ad subiciendum. This is a prerogative
writ requiring the body of a person alleged to be unlawfully
'2 HOLDSWORTH, HIsT. OF ENG. LAW (3d ed. 1923) 169.
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restrained to be brought before the judge or court that the
lawfulness of the restraint may be determined. The case is
disposed of on the hearing. The writ is addressed to the one
who has custody of the detained person and he must state
the cause and warrant for the detention.
For the next two or three centuries the writ of habeas
corpus became the battleground of the courts. Sometimes
the sovereigns were so strong and the judges so servile that
one who was in prison "by command of the King" remained
there. At other times the writ was freely granted by judges
throughout England in spite of the King's displeasure.
Slowly, however, the writ became an instrument of daily use
in English legal life, encountering more and more seldom
any setbacks from the royal power.
Darnel's Case 5 in 1627 precipitated a conflict between
King and Parliament. Charles I was unpopular with Parlia-
ment and was constantly seeking to augment his "divine"
right at the expense of the people. Charles had "requested"
a "loan" from Darnel and four other knights. These "1benevo-
lences" or forced loans were common whenever the uing
needed money, which was often. Darnel and the others re-
fused to contribute and they were thrown into prison per
special mandatum regis. The warrant of arrest had been
signed by two members of the Privy Council.
Darnel applied to the King's Bench for a writ of habeas
corpus. It was issued but upon the trial, the prisoners were
remanded to prison. The judges held office at the pleasure
of the King and in this case superseded the legal process
of law by an arbitrary one of their own. The chief justice,
Sir Nicholas Hyde, upheld the crown on the flimsiest grounds.
Even years later, the judges defended the right of kings,
in the "Ship Money" case brought by John Hampden, assert-
ing that in times of emergency, the King's prerogative was
unlimited and took precedence over all statutes or charters
of England. "If the judgment in the ship money case was
more flagrantly iniquitous, it was not so extensively de-
structive as the judgment in the DarneZ Case." 6
'3 CAR I (1627).
'HALLAM, CONST. HiST. OF ENG. (1913) 4, 221.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Darnet's Case led to the enactment in 1628 of the Peti-
tion of Right 7 by Parliament and which was signed by the
King for certain financial considerations. The Petition of
Right prohibited the King from ordering arbitrary imprison-
ment and granted the writ of habeas corpus to one so com-
mitted upon his demand to the King's Court or to the Court
of Common Pleas. This reaffirmed the right of habeas
corpus and took an important step by extending the power
of granting the writ to the Court of Common Pleas.
In 1679 when the second Charles was on the throne,
a further step was taken by Parliament in solidifying and
protecting the rights gained. This was the enactment of
the Habeas Corpus Act 8 sometimes called Shaftesbury's Act,
after its proponent, Lord Shaftesbury. It was the outcome
of Jenkes' Case (1676) when Lord Chancellor Nottingham
refused to issue the writ except during legal term when the
court sat. The Act provided among other things, that the
writ could be granted at times other than legal term, by
the Lord Chancellor, returnable immediately and he could
liberate the prisoner upon security for his appearance in
court. It also provided that persons released on the writ
should not be re-committed for the same offense except by
the court having cognizance of the case. Heavy penalties
were imposed upon judges who delayed the issuance of the
writ or wilfully violated the terms of the Habeas Corpus
Act.
All statutes heretofore passed concerning the writ of
habeas corpus had provided for criminal cases only. In 1816
by statute 9 the writ was extended to cover cases where per-
sons were unlawfully restrained in private custody. The
most important provisions were:
1. The writ of habeas corpus shall be issued * * *
for persons restrained of liberty by other than
criminal or civil process.
2. The judges shall examine into the truth of the
facts and if there is a reasonable doubt as to the
16 CAR I, c. 1088 (1628).
831 CAR II, c. 2 (1679).
'56 GEo. III, c. 100 (1816).
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legality of the imprisonment, the person should be
released on bail.
3. The writ may be issued to cover all waters, ports,
harbors, etc., on the coast of England. This was
to take care of illegal detention on board ship.
The application of the writ was still limited to Great
Britain, but in 1861 the writ was permitted to run from the
English Court throughout the British Empire except in those
colonies and dominions where the local courts had authority
to issue it.
In the cases of Cox v. Haces 10 and Ex parte Art
O'Brien ' it was held that whereas an appeal against re-
fusal of the writ might be taken by the appellant to the
House of Lords, the Crown cannot appeal against the grant
of the writ.
Today the writ of habeas corpus must be granted in any
land under the British flag. It may emanate from any court
named by statute and at any time.
"The writ of habeas corpus is one of the four important
means whereby the power of the sovereign has been lim-
ited." 12 To it in large measure, do Anglo-Saxons throughout
the world owe their freedom from oppression and their repu-
tation as a liberty-loving people.
The American colonies, while still under the rule of Eng-
land, always considered the writ as one of their rights, guar-
anteed to them by the various charters and statutes as to
native-born Englishmen. Although no colonial charter spe'-
cifically mentions the writ, all of them granted to the colo-
nists all the rights and privileges enjoyed by the inhabitants
of the British Isles.
Generally, during colonial history, the writ was granted
without question. In some cases, particularly under the gov-
ernorship of Sir Edmund Andros, the writ was suspended,
but not for long. Under his administration, "Magna Carta
was no protection against abolition of the right of habeas
- 15 A. C. 506 (1890).
[1923] A. C. 603.
i 1 HAYES, HIST. OF MOD. EUROPE (1929) 432.
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corpus." 13 But in spite of Andros' vociferous denial "Do
not think the laws of England follow you to the ends of the
earth" 1" the laws of England did operate in the American
colonies.
When the writ was denied, public opinion and legal
circles were so aroused that the judges felt the full weight
of disapproval. In. Massachusetts, in 1689, a tax had been
levied oppressively and unlawfully. The Reverend John
Wise, an itinerant preacher, refused to pay the tax and de-
nounced it violently and often. He was arrested and im-
prisoned and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Judge
Dudley refused to issue the writ. Wise sued the judge in a
civil proceeding and won.
In New York, in 1707, Governor Cornbury issued a
warrant of arrest illegally for two ministers of the gospel,
Malkemie and Hampton. It was alleged that they had
neglected to procure from the governor licenses to preach.
Their imprisonment was of short duration, since a writ of
habeas corpus was granted and on its return, they were
released.
The New Jersey Assembly, in 1710, by resolution de-
nounced judges who had refused to issue the writ to one
Thomas Gordon.
When the Federal Government was organized its powers,
duties and rights were purely statutory since, unlike the
states, it had had no previous existence. The Constitution
of the United States 15 provides that the writ "shall not be
suspended unless * * * the public safety requires it." This
clause was proposed by Pinckney in the Constitutional Con-
vention and was a deviation from Morris' original proposal.
It is followed in this by most of the states though in some
states suspension of the writ is absolutely forbidden while
in others, the duration of suspension is limited.
Originally, there was only one method by which a writ
could be issued out of a Federal Court. The Federal Judi-
ciary Act of September, 1789 16 provided that the writ could
1 HAWTHORNE, HisT. OF U. S. (1898) 237.
14Ibid.
'U. S. CONST. ART. I, §9 (2).
111 STAT. 81 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. §451 (1926).
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be issued only when the prisoner was committed to prison,
under or by color of authority of the United States. The
case of Ex parte Dorr,17 illustrates the attitude of the Fed-
eral Court. Thomas Dorr was tried in Rhode Island for
treason, not against the nation but against the state. He
sought a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court of
the United States. In refusing to grant the writ, the court
held "N9either the Supreme Court nor any other court of
the United States can issue a habeas corpus to bring up a
prisoner, who is in custody of a state, for any purpose "
The Federal Courts were loath to inquire into the ad-
ministration of the state courts but the famous Nullification
Movement in South Carolina, led by John Calhoun, was the
prime reason for a series of acts passed by Congress which
enabled the Federal Courts, in some measure, to supervise
what had formerly been purely state matters. These acts 18
extended the power of the Federal Courts to issue writs in
cases where prisoners were held in custody by states, in
violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States. Rev. Stat. 753 1Sa provided-"the writ shall not ex-
tend to a prisoner unless he is in custody (of a state) for
an act done or committed in pursuance of a law of the
United States * * * or in custody in violation of the Consti-
tution, of a law or treaty of the United States." Under this
section, writs were issued in certain cases of "ugency" where
the prisoner was in state custody, and the federal government
was involved.1 9
In re Neagle 20 illustrates clearly what the court termed
"cases of urgency" in which the Federal Courts will inter-
vene. The petitioner was a David Neagle, who had been a
deputy marshal of the United States for the District of
California. He was assigned as a bodyguard to Justice
Field, of the United States Circuit Court, who had received
- 15 U. S. 320 (1844).
14 STAT. 634 (1833), 28 U. S. C. A. §452 (1926); 5 STAT. 539 (1842),
28 U. S. C. A. §453 (1926) ; 14 STAT. 385 (1867), 28 U. S. C. A. §453 (1926).
'a 14 STAT. 385 (1867), 28 U. S. C. A. §453 (1926).
" Ex parte Royal1, 117 U. S. 241, 6 Sup. Ct. 734 (1886) ; Wildenhus' Case,
120 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 385 (1886); In re Lovey, 134 U. S. 372, 10 Sup. Ct.
584 (1890) ; In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658 (1890) ; New York v.
Eno, 155 U. S. 89, 15 Sup. Ct. 30 (1894).
Supra note 19.
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several intimations that his life was in danger. While in
the performance of his duty, Neagle shot and killed David
Terry, who, it was alleged, had attempted to murder Field.
Neagle was arrested for murder on a state warrant. He
petitioned the Federal Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
It was held that Neagle was an officer of the United States
and that he was in custody of a state for an act done in pur-
suance of an order of the United States.21 A writ of habeas
corpus was issued and a trial of the facts held. Neagle was
discharged from the custody of the state of California.
"It is thus only in cases of peculiar urgency that the
federal courts will interfere in the first instance by habeas
corpus Where a prisoner is in state custody. But in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction it may issue the writ
to inquire into the validity of a detention, under authority
of an inferior court, to determine if jurisdiction and author-
ity are present." 22
In Whitten v. Tomlinson 23 the petition and return
showed that the petitioner was detained in custody of the
sheriff under commitment after having been brought from
Massachusetts to Connecticut on the application of the gov-
ernor of the latter state. This was an appeal from a decree
of the Circuit Court denying the writ. Mr. Justice Gray,
after discussing the various methods used for bringing pro-
ceedings begun in state courts to the federal courts, con-
tinued, "There could be no better illustration than this case
affords of the wisdom, if not the necessity, of the rule * * *
that a prisoner in custody, under authority of a state, should
not, except in a case of peculiar urgency, be discharged by
a court or judge of the United States, upon a writ of habeas
corpus, in advance of a proceeding in the courts of the state
to test the validity of his arrest and detention. To adopt a
different rule would unduly interfere with the exercise of
* * * jurisdiction of the states and with the performance by
this court of its appropriate duties." 24
Supra note 18a.
2
-In re Neagle, supra note 19.
21160 U. S. 231, 16 Sup. Ct. 297 (1895).
2
1 Ibid.
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In Ireland v. Woods 25 the petitioner was arrested in
New York and at the request of the Governor of New Jersey,
extradited to that state. In refusing to grant a writ of
habeas corpus, the court said, "The validity of a statute is
not drawn into question every time rights claimed under
such statute are controverted nor is the validity of an au-
thority every time an act done by such authority is dis-
puted." 26
The Federal Constitution does not provide a method for
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. At the beginning of
the Civil War, President Lincoln, by proclamation, suspend-
ed the writ. At once, the question arose: In what branch
of the government, executive or legislative, is vested the
power to suspend the writ. Great controversy arose not
only in legal circles but among laymen. Argument waxed
furiously and a veritable hail of pamphlets and articles,
some attacking the President's act as a usurpation of power,
others upholding his right, flooded the nation. The authors 27
did not, apparently, consider the question settled, academi-
cally, at least, even after Chief Justice Taney, in 1861, in
E_- parte Merryma, 28 held that Congress alone possessed
the power of suspending the operation of the writ. Other
opinions 29 upheld this view though there were dissenting
opinionsSo
Practically, the situation was settled by Congress which
on March 3, 1863, authorized the President to suspend the
writ, when in his opinion, the state of the country demanded
it. It was held, however, that during the suspension, per-
sons who had a claim for unlawful imprisonment still had
their common law right for false imprisonment and mali-
cious prosecution.3 1
=246 U. S. 323, 38 Sup. Ct. 319 (1918).
Ibid.
' A few of the leading ones are: BINNEY, TREATISE ON HABEAS CORPUS;
BULLIT, REVIEW OF BINNEY'S TREATISE; MONTGOMERY, REMARKS ON BINNEY'S
TREATISE; KENNEDY, WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; GROSS, WRIT OF HABEAs
CORPUS.
' Fed. Cas. 9,487, Taney 246, 9 Am. L. Reg. 524 (1861).
' Griffen v. Wilcox, 2 Ind. 370 (1863) ; In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359 (1863).
zEx parte Field, Fed. Cas. 4,261, 5 Blatchf. 63 (1862).
SzEx parte Bollman, 2 U. S. 554 (1807); Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart.
(0. S.) 530, 6 Am. Dec. 675 (La. 1815); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454,
143 Pac. 947 (1914).
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In Ex parte Milligan,32 a case arising out of the sus-
pension of the writ, it was held that suspension of the privi-
lege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ
itself. The writ issues as a matter of course and on its re-
turn, the court decides whether the applicant is denied the
right of proceeding further.
Lambdin Milligan was arrested by the military authori-
ties of the department of Indiana on a charge of aiding and
abetting the Confederate forces. He contended that since
Indiana was not within the military zone of operations, he
was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus and a trial by the
civil authorities. Eminent counsel were on both sides of
the argument. Milligan lost hi§ motion.
"A distinction has been made, however, between the
suspension of the privilege of the writ in a constitutional
sense and the right of a military commander to refuse obedi-
ence to such a writ when justified by the exigencies of war
or the ipso facto suspension which takes place whenever
martial law exists and it has been held entirely competent
for the officer in command to suspend or discharge writs
when necessary." 33
In some states the writ is considered of such great im-
portance and protection against unlawful and unjust power
that the suspension of the writ is forbidden by their con-
stitutions while in other states, the time during which it
may be suspended is limited, usually, to three or six months.
Originally, this had also been the intention of the framers
of the Federal Constitution.
Massachusetts is the only state that ever suspended the
operation of the writ. This occurred during the early years
of its statehood from November, 1786, to July, 1787, when
the so-called Shay's Rebellion threatened to overthrow the
Commonwealth.
During the War of the Rebellion, the entire Confeder-
acy was involved when the Confederate Government sus-
pended the writ for the duration of the War.34
-71 U. S. 2 (1866).
'I re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1889).
"In re Cain, 60 N. C. 525 (1864) ; State v. Sparks, 27 Tex. 705 (1864).
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New York follows closely the Federal Government in
its Constitution 35 in its provision regarding the writ of
habeas corpus. When the Civil Practice Act was adopted,
succeeding the Code of Civil Procedure, it prescribed rules
and regulations for the issuance of the writ.3 6  It is in-
teresting to note that the Attorney-General or District At-
torney may, unlike in England, appeal from a final order
discharging the prisoner on a writ of habeas corpus.37  Sec-
tion 1274 allows the prisoner to appeal from an order deny-
ing release.
The principal inquiry of the writ is as to the jurisdic-
tion or power of the person or tribunal to detain the indi-
vidual imprisoned or restrained. If the power exists and
the magistrate has authority to pronounce the judgment for
the cause assigned, the statute forbids review of his decision
by this writ; if not, the prisoner is discharged. No errors
of law or judgment will be inquired into and corrected.38
Persons accused of violating the Prohibition Law have
found an ally in the writ. It was held, in Matter of
Horschler,;9 that the writ will lie to discharge the prisoner
after conviction, on a charge of possessing liquor where the
only evidence was that of a police officer who entered re-
lator's house without a warrant and found liquor therein.
Except in rare cases where the facts before the court
cannot be materially changed, qualified or explained, impor-
tant issues should not be determined in a habeas corpus
proceeding.40
The writ of habeas corpus, throughout the centuries, has
grown but slowly. It overcame the tremendous forces bent
N. Y. CONST. art. I, §4.
N. Y. C. P. A. §§415, 1230, 1274, 1275.
-N. Y. C. P. A. §1275.
People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y1. 559 (1875) ; People ex rel.
Corkran v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176, 64 N. E. 825 (1902) ; Bungart v. Wells, 57
App. Div. 140, 68 N. Y. Supp. 59 (2d Dept. 1901); Price v. Hayes, 151 App.
Div. 561, 136 N. Y. Supp. 854 (2d Dept. 1912).
116 Misc. 243, 190 N. Y. Supp. 350 (1921).
"People ex rel. Collins v. McLaughlin, 194 N. Y. 556, 86 N. E. 1119(1909).
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upon its extinction and extended itself, with altered political
and social conditions, to rest like a protecting hand, over our
entire legal fabric. When injustice can no longer harm, then
habeas corpus will have outlived its usefulness. Until then,
it is a mighty shield.
ALBERT S. GLASS.
Brooklyn, New York.
